Lobbying of Foreign Enterprises and Vested Interests in Japan

(Abstract)

Based on my working experience with a Japanese management consultancy that primarily advised German companies doing business in Japan, I got the impression that European enterprises are too weak to lobby there. There were only few possibilities for individual Japanese companies and nearly none for foreign ones to influence corporatist Japanese political decision-making in the past,  of which the proponents were the longtime ruling party LDP and the trade association Nippon Keidanren and its predecessors. An expensive election system, 'money politics' and corruption were the consequences that finally led to a temporary removal of the LDP as governing party and the creation of a number of new or better laws: Not until the 1990s, did laws like the Political Elections Law, Political Funds Regulation Law and Political Party Subsidy Law start to break up those networks of political tribes, factions, personal support groups and old-boys that had existed during the so-called 1955-one-party-system for some forty years. Ties between the LDP and Keidanren that had existed for many years were cut and the trade association's political influence decreased. Therefore, one of the utmost important findings of my master's thesis was that political reforms since the 1990s had led to the transition of the once corporatist system of political decision-making to a now pluralistic one. They could not actually end the influence of the aforementioned groups but more members of the representatives got involved. This transition should enable foreign businesses on-site to participate in the Japanese system of political decision-making and, as I have shown in my master's thesis, NAKANO's model of client-oriented politics could be a way to do it. One of the first outcomes of these changes was the emergence of some new public affairs- and lobbying- consultancies.

In four short case studies concerning rising industries on the Japanese market, namely lumber, healthcare, generics and automobile, I have analyzed foreign lobbying activities of theirs on-site. The concerned companies represented all lobbying types (ranging from application-oriented lobbying and legislative lobbying up to funds lobbying) and all dimensions (ranging from monitoring and evaluating on to intrinsic lobbying). The lobbyists' most important barter was in every case information and all the questioned individuals admitted that they preferred ministerial bureaucrats to representatives as lobbying addressees. As I have shown, lobbying concerns small, medium-sized and big businesses, but it is most systematic in large businesses. The only interviewed medium-sized company does not have systematic lobbying and wants its trade association to lobby however on the other hand not have any Japanese competitors, either.

For a full version of the master's thesis "Riken Seiji - Lobbying of Foreign Enterprises and Vested Interests in Japan" please follow this link (German only).